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The ADA's Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement and "Innocent Third Parties"
Alex B. Long*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Americans with Disabilities Act' ("ADA") has
proven an uneasy fit within the spectrum of existing federal anti-discrimination
law. Unlike most other anti-discrimination laws, which require employers to
treat their employees in the same fashion regardless of certain characteristics, the
ADA proceeds from the assumption that "in order to treat some people equally,
we must treat them differently."2 Thus, employers are required to make
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business.3 The ADA's use of this "difference model"4 has, in
recent years, become one of the more controversial features of the statute.5
The inherently fact-specific nature of what constitutes a "reasonable"
accommodation in a given case and when the hardship imposed on an employer
in providing that accommodation becomes "undue" has largely prevented courts
from establishing clear guidelines for litigants to follow.6 Congress's failure to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. My
thanks to my colleagues at Oklahoma City University who participated in the faculty
colloquium for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-2213 (2000).
2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part & dissenting in part); Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,andReasonableAccommodation, 46 DuKEL.J.
1,9-11 (1996).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
4. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 10.
5. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or
Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1048-49 (2000) (noting the differences between

the ADA and other anti-discrimination statutes and stating that "[n]egative affirmative
action rhetoric has begun to creep into recent ADA decisions"); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 40
(2000) ("Many of the problems emerging from judicial decisions concerning the ADA
stem from the ADA's reliance on a vision of equality that is particularly
controversial-the principle that differential treatment, rather than the same treatment,
is necessary to create equality.").
6. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001) ("ADA

cases come in an amazing variety of hues and shapes, and some jobs are sui generis, so
we are reluctant to set hard and fast rules.").
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more precisely define these terms has certainly not helped courts in this
endeavor.' To some, the courts are not entirely without blame for the lack of
clear standards.8 Some, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, have charged that, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the reasonable accommodation requirement
unduly restricts the discretion of employers, 9 while others have charged that the
federal courts have interpreted and applied the requirement in an overly
restrictive, pro-employer fashion."° For critics who fall into the latter category,
the tendency of courts to interpret and apply the reasonable accommodation
requirement in a pro-employer fashion stems from either a failure to fully

appreciate how the difference model employed by the ADA distinguishes the
statute from other anti-discrimination measures" or a concern that the reasonable

7. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 48 VAND. L. REv. 391,397 (1996) ("Congress's adoption of this vague
[undue hardship] standard was a serious mistake, principally because the standard fails
to define legal obligations and rights sufficiently to inform businesses and their
employees with disabilities of the nature and extent of those obligations and rights.");
Samuel Issacharoff& Justin Nelson, Discriminationwith a Difference: Can Employment
DiscriminationLawAccommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C. L. REV.
307, 339-40 (2001) ("[W]hat is striking about the ADA is the extent to which the Act
leaves courts in the role of legislating so extensively in Congress's stead.").
8. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 414 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority opinion renders the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision "a standardless grab bag-leaving it to the courts to decide which workplace
preferences ... can be deemed 'reasonable"'); Barnett v. US Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105,
1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (Trott, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority opinion leaves
employers, employees, and the lawyers who represent them "with no guidance, none at
all"), vacated by 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
9. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 418-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
opinion "incorrectly subjects all employer rules and practices to the requirement of
reasonable accommodation" even where the rule or practice does not work to exclude a
disabled employee because of the employee's disability); Thomas F. O'Neil III &
Kenneth M. Reiss, ReassigningDisabledEmployeesUnder the ADA: PreferencesUnder
the Guiseof Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 360 (2001) (criticizing the approach of some
courts, in part, on the grounds that their interpretations of the reasonable accommodation
requirement unduly limit employer discretion).
10. Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants,
34 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101, 108 (1999).
11. Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neutral" Employer Policies and the ADA: The
ImplicationsofUS Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REv.
1, 15 (2002) (stating that the likely reason why courts are reluctant to require an employer
to depart from a neutral policy as part of an accommodation is "because they cannot get
beyond thinking about the ADA in traditional Title VII terms"); S. Elizabeth Wilbom
Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are
Different, 33 CONN.L. REV. 603, 640 (2001) ("In adopting the Title VII practice of
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accommodation requirement amounts to the provision of special rights for
individuals with disabilities. 2 Regardless of the cause, as litigation under the
ADA has increased, so too has controversy surrounding the reasonable
accommodation requirement. 13
While employers and individuals with disabilities have battled over the
scope of an employer's obligations under the ADA, one group has frequently
been caught in the middle. In numerous instances, an employer's obligation to
alter its standard operating procedures has relegated other employees to mere
observers as the courts make decisions that could potentially affect their future.
Because the reasonable accommodation requirement requires employers to
modify their regular practices, sometimes other employees may feel the effects
from such alterations. Several of the possible reasonable accommodations
recognized by courts have the potential to require other employees to assume
unwanted, additional job duties. 4 The accommodation of reassignment to a
vacant position, under which an employer may be required to place an employee
with a disability in a different position altogether, has perhaps generated the most
controversy. Because this accommodation could require an employer to depart
from a neutral policy that would otherwise prohibit the reassignment and
simultaneously deny the vacancy to another employee entitled to the position
under the policy, it has presented courts with some of the most difficult
accommodation questions."
Thus far, a consistent approach to these types of cases has largely eluded
courts. The result has been a state of affairs where some charge that courts have
shown too much deference to employers,' 6 while others charge that, if left
unchecked, the reasonable accommodation requirement would turn the ADA into
a preference statute and impose "an unreasonable imposition on the employers
and coworkers of disabled employees."' 7 Although a solution that would
adequately balance the competing interests of all three concerned parties and

denying a requested reassignment when it conflicts with collective bargaining
agreements, a majority of courts have ignored critical differences between the ADA and
Title VII.").
12.

Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities": Why the Definition of

DisabilityUnder theAmericans with DisabilitiesAct Should Be Revised to Eliminatethe
SubstantialLimitation Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REV. 83, 143 (2000); Diller, supranote
5, at 46-47.

13. Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1048.
14. Stephen F.Befort, The Most DifficultADA ReasonableAccommodationIssues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 439, 449 (2002)
(discussing the possible extra burdens imposed on other employees by granting a disabled

employee a leave of absence).
15. Id. at 439.
16. Anderson, supra note 11, at 13.
17. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998).
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address all accommodation situations would be virtually impossible, there
clearly is room for improvement.
This Article suggests that the most effective and equitable method of
dealing with many of the most difficult accommodation issues is to focus on the
effect that providing an accommodation would have on other employees. Part
II lays out the background of the reasonable accommodation requirement and
discusses some of the ways that the requirement can impact other employees.
Part III focuses on how courts have dealt with situations in which the rights of
one individual under anti-discrimination laws have come into conflict with the
interests of other employees. It discusses various situations arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which the Supreme Court has sought to
protect the interests of those whom it has referred to as "innocent third parties."'"
Part IV discusses in greater detail cases arising under the ADA that involve
roughly the same dynamic, including the Supreme Court's recent decision in US
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,'9 which dealt with the proposed reassignment of an
employee with a disability in contravention of an employer's unilaterallyimposed seniority policy. Part IV also considers the competing approaches
adopted by various courts in such cases and discusses the lack of overall clarity
in the area even after (and perhaps because of) Barnett. Part V explains why a
clearer standard is needed and why the focus of that standard should be on the
impact that an accommodation will have on other employees. Finally, Part VI
suggests a proposed addition to the evolving law concerning the reasonable
accommodation requirement that would provide that an accommodation
resulting in an adverse employment action for another employee or a violation
of another employee's contractual rights is not a reasonable accommodation.
II. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT OF
TITLE I OF THE ADA
A. Basic Background
The ADA protects qualified individuals with disabilities from
discrimination. According to the statutory definition, a "qualified individual
with a disability" is one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires."2 While the concept of reasonable accommodation helps
define the ADA's protected class, it is also the source of important employer
obligations. Under the ADA, it is a discriminatory practice for an employer to

18. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239 (1982) (quoting City of Los
Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 723 (1978)).
19. 53 U.S. 391 (2002).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
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fail to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the employer's business."
The reasonable accommodation requirement is crucial to the ADA's goal
of ensuring equal employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.
According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the
reasonable accommodation requirement "is best understood as a means by which
barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability
are removed or alleviated."22 Thus, Congress's inclusion of the reasonable
accommodation concept represented a recognition on its part that discrimination
against individuals with disabilities frequently involves an unwillingness to make
minor, relatively inexpensive modifications to established ways of doing
business that would allow individuals with disabilities to participate in the
workplace and in society as a whole.23
Although the ADA itself does not define the term "reasonable
accommodation," it does include a non-exhaustive list of possible reasonable
accommodations:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.2
Even when an accommodation is reasonable, an employer is not required
to make the accommodation if it would result in an "undue hardship." The
ADA's undue hardship defense ensures that employers do not have to make
accommodations that would require them to incur "significant difficulty or
expense."2 The statute includes a number of factors that should be considered
in determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
Specifically, the statute provides as follows:

21. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
22. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2003).
23. Malloy, supranote 11, at 623.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).

25. Id. § 12111 (1)(A).
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In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of
persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of
its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
relationship
26
entity.
If an employer can demonstrate that a proposed accommodation, even though
reasonable on its face, would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
business, the employer is not liable for failing to make the accommodation.27
B. The PotentialImpact of a Reasonable Accommodation on
"Innocent Third Parties"
The initial concern that groups representing employers seemed to have
concerning the reasonable accommodation requirement was the potential costs
that it might impose on employers.28 Business groups were concerned about
what they perceived to be Congress's failure to define adequately the terms
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" and pushed Congress to
place dollar limits on an employer's duty to make accommodations.29 While
Congress declined to define the terms more precisely, ADA supporters sought
to reassure employers by pointing to studies that indicated that the cost of the
average accommodation was fairly low."

26. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
27. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
28. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 425-27.
29. Id.
30. See generally S. REP. No. 101-116, at 89 (1989) (indicating that the costs to
employers would be under $100 for thirty percent of employees and that accommodation
for fifty-one percent of employees would require no cost at all); Equal Employment
Opportunities for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578, 8583 (Feb. 28, 1991)
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Over time, it has become clear that the greatest potential source of conflict
over reasonable accommodation involves accommodations that cost employers
little or nothing to make. The most controversial accommodations are not those
that are expensive, but those that limit the discretion of employers or adversely
impact other employees.
1. Accommodations That are Unlikely to Impact Other Employees
Some of the possible accommodations listed in the ADA can be expected
to have little, if any, impact on other employees. 3' Instead, in the vast majority
of cases, the impact of providing these accommodations is borne almost
exclusively by the employer. Such accommodations typically involve an
employer adding to or modifying the physical workplace in some way. For
example, modifying a disabled employee's work station or acquiring special
equipment in order to allow an employee to perform the essential functions of2
3
a job would be unlikely to have any adverse impact on other employees.
Although it is possible to conjure up scenarios in which the provision of these
types of accommodation might somehow adversely impact other employees, by
and large, the impact in such cases is only felt by the employer.
Other employees are also unlikely to be affected by some accommodations
that do not involve physical changes to the workplace. For example, under the
ADA, an employer might be required to provide a deaf employee with an
interpreter in some instances or modify its examination procedures by giving an
oral examination to a deaf applicant instead of a written examination.33 In either
situation, other employees are unlikely to be affected.
2. Job Restructuring
As envisioned by the EEOC, the accommodation of job restructuring
essentially involves the "swapping" of marginal job functions between a disabled
employee and non-disabled employees.34 If a disabled employee is unable to
(citing study concluding that more than eighty percent of accommodations cost less than
$500); see also Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview,
1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 923,929-30 (citing the cost concerns of employers and, among other
statistics, a study concluding that only twenty-two percent of disabled workers required
special accommodations and for that group fifty-one percent ofthe accommodations were
achieved at no cost).
31. See Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin and the ADA's
ReasonableAccommodation Requirementin Competitive Settings, 77 OR. L. REV. 1337,

1346 (1998); Malloy, supranote 11, at 615-16.
32. See Befort &Donesky, supra note 5, at 1058; Long, supranote 31, at 1346-48.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12119(b) (2000).
34. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2003).
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perform some, but not all, of the marginal functions of a particular position, the
employer may be required to redistribute those functions to another position,
while redistributing some functions of the other position to the disabled
employee." The reallocation of marginal, non-essential job functions between
a disabled and a non-disabled employee will obviously have a direct effect on the
non-disabled employee. a6 Perfect equality in terms of the burdens and
desirability of the duties swapped is, of course, nearly impossible. Assuming
that the reallocated functions of the disabled employee's position are no more
onerous than the original functions of the non-disabled employee's position, the
impact of the accommodation, although present, is fairly minimal.37 However,
it is also possible that, as a result of a swap with a disabled employee, a nondisabled employee may become saddled with greater responsibilities, more
onerous tasks, or significantly less desirable duties.3"
3. Part-Time or Modified Work Schedules and Extended Leave
Like the job restructuring accommodation, allowing a disabled employee
to switch from a full-time position to a part-time position or otherwise modifying
the employee's work schedule may also have adverse consequences for nondisabled employees. In the case of a switch from full-time to part-time
employment, presumably someone will have to pick up the slack created by the
switch. Unless the employer hires an additional employee, current employees
will most likely inherit unwanted new job duties.39 It is also possible that another
employee may be required to transfer positions, and learn new job duties, in
order to perform the duties of the disabled employee.4 ° Likewise, allowing a
disabled employee to alter his work schedule might necessitate a similar change
in the schedule of another employee to cover the vacancy created by the absence
of the disabled employee.

35. Id.

36. But see Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1058-59 (stating that "job
restructuring ... would have little impact upon the rights of other employees").
37. See generally Befort, supra note 14, at 448 ("[S]uch an accommodation does
not necessarily result in a net increase of work duties for non-disabled employees.").
38. See generallyAnderson, supranote 11, at 33 (noting that with job restructuring
"other employees ... may be required to bear the entire burden of the marginal tasks").
39. Cf Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citing Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1995)) (holding that plaintiff who requested a switch to a straight
daytime shift was not a qualified individual with a disability because the proposed
accommodation would have resulted in other employees having to work harder or
longer).
40. See generally Befort, supra note 14, at 449 (stating same in the context of
granting a disabled employee an extended leave of absence).
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The same potential for an adverse impact on other employees exists when
an employer departs from an established leave policy in order to accommodate
a disabled employee. The EEOC's position is that an employer may be required
to allow a disabled employee to take unpaid leave in excess of the twelve weeks
mandated by the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").41 It is also possible
that granting an employee leave beyond that specified in an employer's leave
policy could, in some circumstances, be a reasonable accommodation.42 As is
the case with modifying an employee's work schedule, such extended leave
could require other employees to temporarily assume some of the job duties of
the absent employee."3
4. Reassignment to a Vacant Position
Reassignment to a vacant position differs from the other possible
accommodations listed in the ADA in several respects. Most obviously, it is the
only accommodation listed in the statute that envisions accommodating a
disabled employee by removing the employee from her present position. The
other accommodations listed in the statute seek to enable the disabled employee
to continue performing the essential functions of her existing position. By its
nature, the accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position seeks to
accommodate a disabled employee by removing the employee from a position
involving essential functions that the employee cannot perform, even with a
reasonable accommodation, and placing that employee in an altogether new
position." In this sense, the accommodation is more sweeping than the others
listed in the statute. Because the accommodation of reassignment to a vacant
position alters the status quo of the workplace in a way that the other possible
accommodations do not, it has the greatest potential to impinge upon an
employer's business discretion. Not surprisingly, it is also the accommodation
that has the greatest potential to adversely impact other employees.4 5

41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (2003).
42. See Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638,646 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citing Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 171-72 (1st Cir. 1998)).
43. Befort, supra note 14, at 448-49. Similarly, the EEOC has suggested that an
employer violates the ADA when, as part of a reduction in force, it bases its decision as
to which employees to discharge on past productivity and, consequently, discharges a
disabled employee who needed leave and a modified work schedule as a reasonable

accommodation because that employee was less productive than other employees. See
EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Underthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct, EEOC COMPL. MAN. § 902 No. 915.002 n.55
(Oct. 17,2002), availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter
Enforcement Guidance].
44. Befort, supra note 14, at 448.
45. See id. (stating that reassignment to a vacant position and leave of absence

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

According to the legislative history, the purpose of reassignment is twofold:
"a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent
the employee from being out of work and [the] employer from losing a valuable
worker."46 Aside from the fact that reassignment places the focus on a
completely different job than the one that the disabled employee currently
occupies, the accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position also takes a
different approach with what it requires of employers. As Justice Scalia
observed in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, all of the other accommodations listed
in the ADA require an employer "to modify or remove (within reason) policies
and practices that burden a disabled person 'because of[his] disability."'47 The
other accommodations listed in the statute may require the removal of barriers
if it is the employee's actual disability that prevents the employee from
overcoming the barriers. 4' For example, the barrier that prevents an employee
with back problems from performing the essential function of standing at an
assembly line for an extended period of time is the requirement of standing.49
Under appropriate circumstances, an employer could be required to modify the
employee's work schedule to allow for more breaks or modify the physical
workplace if that would help eliminate the barrier. Regardless, with all of the
other accommodations listed in the statute, the policies or practices of an
employer that are subject to modification are those that fall more heavily upon
a disabled employee because of the disabilityof the employee."0
In contrast, with the accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position,
the employer may be required to modify an existing policy or practice that is in
no way related to the disabled employee's disability. For example, an employer
may have a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy against transfer where the
transfer would result in a demotion, such as in the case of prohibiting salaried
employees from transferring to a vacant hourly position."' If a disabled
employee wished to transfer to the hourly position as an accommodation, the
employee's disability would pose no obstacle (assuming the employee was
capable of performing the essential functions of the vacant position). The only

"impose[] greater burdens on employers and co-workers than do the other types of
accommodation recognized by the ADA").
46. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
345; see also S.REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989).
47. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 413 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)) (emphasis added).
48. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Cf Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222 (11 th Cir. 1997) (involving
such a policy). The difference between Duckett and the hypothetical is that in Duckett

such atransfer would have violated both the employer's policy and the relevant provision
of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1225.
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barrier preventing the employee from assuming the position is the employer's
neutral policy. Thus, in order to reassign the disabled employee to the vacant
position, the employer would be required to modify a workplace policy or
practice that is in no way a barrier to the position because of the employee's
disability.52
Perhaps recognizing the potential effects of reassignment on employers, the
EEOC has sought to limit the scope of this accommodation. First, reassignment
as an accommodation is only available to employees, not applicants.53 Second,
as both the statute and the EEOC suggest, the employee must actually be
qualified for the vacant position.54 Third, "an employer is not required to
promote an individual with a disability as an accommodation."55 Finally,
reassignment is an accommodation of last resort, to be used only "when
accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an undue
hardship."'56
The reassignment accommodation clearly impacts employers in ways that
the other accommodations listed in the statute do not. However, reassignment
may also have potentially dramatic results for other employees. If a position is
"vacant" in the sense that no one is currently performing the duties of the
position, reassignment of a disabled employee means that other employees who
may want the position may not be able to obtain it. Moreover, as later discussed
in greater detail, it may also mean that another employee who would otherwise
be entitled to the position under an employer's existing policy could be denied
the position in order to accommodate a disabled employee.57 In some instances,
an employer facing a decision as to whether to depart from such a policy may
fird itself in a Catch 22. While an employee handbook containing the various
policies of an employer generally does not create enforceable employment
contract rights on the part of other employees, it is certainly not unheard of for
an employee handbook to amount to an implied employment contract.58 Thus,
if an employer has not been careful to disclaim the existence of a contract when
drafting its employee handbook, it may violate the contractual rights of another
employee when it departs from a stated policy in order to reassign a disabled
employee.
52. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2003).
54. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining discrimination to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability").
55. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2003).
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 97-203 and accompanying text.
58. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
"in South Carolina, [a] claim of breach of implied contract based on employer policies
is available") (citing Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987)).
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C. The ADA 's Attempt to Protect "Innocent ThirdParties"
1. The Direct Threat Defense
Of the several measures within the ADA's statutory language that seek to
protect the interests of other individuals, the direct threat defense is perhaps the
most obvious. Under the ADA, an employer is permitted to insist upon a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety
of other individuals in the workplace.59 Thus, the ADA's anti-discrimination
mandate gives way at the point that an individual poses a "significant risk" to the
health and safety of others, including coworkers.6"
2. The Undue Hardship Defense
As previously discussed, even if an accommodation is reasonable in the
general sense, an employer is not required to provide the accommodation if it
would result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business. 6 To some
extent, the undue hardship defense does take into account the effect of an
accommodation on other employees.6 Among the factors to consider in making
the undue hardship determination is the impact of an accommodation on the
operation of the facility. 63 The EEOC has explained that this impact may include4
"[t]he impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties."'
Ultimately, however, the focus of the undue hardship defense is on "the
operation of the business" of the employer. Although several courts have
suggested that the fact that an accommodation might result in decreased
employee morale might be sufficient under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act
to establish the existence of an undue hardship, the focus of these decisions has
been on how decreased employee morale would ultimately affect the employer.65

59. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (2000).
60. Id. § 12111(3).
61. See supranotes 25-27 and accompanying text.
62. See Long, supra note 31, at 1349-50 (stating that in addition to being a limit
on the effect that an accommodation may have on an employer, the undue hardship
defense can be seen "as a means of preventing unfairness among similarly-situated
employees").
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B)(ii) (2000).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2003).
65. See Barth v. Geib, 2 F.3d 1180, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Holt v. Olmsted
Township Bd. of Trs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 824 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (relying on Sixth
Circuit case law and suggesting that it is conceivable that employee morale problems
could become so acute that they would constitute an undue hardship). See generally Lisa
E. Key, Co- Worker Morale, Confidentiality,and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46
DEPAUL L. REv. 1003, 1022-35 (1997) (discussing decreased coworker morale as a
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In sum, the purpose of examining the factors listed is geared toward the effect
of an accommodation on an employer's business, either from a cost or efficiency
standpoint or from an administrative standpoint."
3. Other Measures
Several other general rules have developed through administrative
regulation or case law that work to protect other employees from any adverse
consequences that might flow from a proposed accommodation. One of the rules
regarding the job restructuring accommodation works to protect other employees
from assuming some of the more burdensome tasks of the disabled employee's
position. Because an employee with a disability is "qualified" only if the
employee is capable of performing the essential functions of a position, an
employer is not required to reassign the essential functions of a particular
position as part of ajob restructuring. 67 Although this rule might be seen as an
attempt to limit an employer's burden under the reasonable accommodation
requirement, the rule also has the effect of limiting the impact of job
restructuring on other employees. According to the EEOC's regulations, one
reason why a function may be deemed "essential" is because the reason the
position exists is to perform that function." Another reason why a function may
be essential is the fact that the function is time-consuming or highly
specialized.69 Therefore, if an employer were required to reallocate such a
function to a non-disabled employee in order to accommodate a disabled
employee, the result could potentially be a significant increase in duties for the
non-disabled employee. Finally, the legislative history concerning the
reassignment accommodation makes it clear that an employer is not required to
"bump" another employee out of a position in order to create a vacancy for a
disabled employee.7 °

Il. INNOCENT THIRD PARTY PROBLEMS IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
There are several instances in which the conflict between employers and
employees who seek the protection of anti-discrimination law has resulted in
other employees getting caught in the crossfire. In each of these instances, the

basis for the undue hardship defense).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(A) (2000).
67. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2003).
68. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).
69. Id. §§ 1630.2(n)(2)(iii), 1630.2(n)(3)(iii).
70. See Enforcement Guidance,supra note 43, at n.82; H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11),
at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
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federal courts have been reluctant at best to allow these third parties to suffer
material harm.
A. Title VII andAffirmative Action
Despite some conceptual dissimilarities, the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement has, perhaps regrettably, drawn frequent
comparisons to affirmative action programs." Obviously, the controversial
nature of affirmative action raises some concerns about how such programs
affect other individuals. The Supreme Court has allowed the use of voluntary
affirmative action programs in private employment under Title VII if they meet
certain criteria.72 First, the plan must be designed to eliminate manifest
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. In addition, the plan must
not unnecessarily trammel the interests of other employees and must not create
an absolute bar to other employees. Finally, the plan must be a temporary
measure, not designed to maintain balance, but to eliminate a manifest
imbalance. 3
The framework devised by the Court expressly takes into account the
interests of employees in the majority group. For example, in Johnson v.
TransportationAgency, the Court found that the employer's promotion policy
that took into account an applicant's sex was a permissible affirmative action
policy, in part because it did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of male
employees nor serve as a bar to male employees." The plan did not set aside
positions for female applicants; instead, sex was only one factor in the promotion
decision. 5 Furthermore, female applicants were not excluded from direct
comparison with male applicants; instead, the plan required all women to
compete for the positions in question. 6
B. Seniority Systems
Recognizing the important role that seniority systems play in labormanagement relations, Congress has made clear in both Title VII and the ADEA
that employers are generally free to abide by the terms of a bona fide seniority
system.77 In keeping with that rule, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Befort, supra note 14, at 441.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1987).
Id. at 638.
See id.
See id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
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allow the interests of employees under such systems to be adversely affected by
the struggle between an employer and another employee.
In FordMotor Co. v. EEOC,8 the Supreme Court held that an employer
charged with Title VII discrimination in hiring can toll the accrual of back pay
liability by unconditionally offering the claimant thejob that the claimant sought,
and the job offer need not be supplemented by an offer of retroactive seniority.79
Central to the Court's reasoning was its concern over the rights of what it termed
"innocent third parties."8 In the period between an employer's refusal to hire
and the new offer to hire, other employees will have accrued seniority. The
Court reasoned that if an employer may cap backpay liability only by forcing
incumbent employees to yield seniority to a person who has not proved, and may
never prove, unlawful discrimination, these innocent third parties might bear a
heavy burden, including the potential for being laid off during a reduction in
force as a result of losing previously accrued seniority.81
Like the ADA, Title VII may sometimes require an employer to modify
existing policies or practices in order to accommodate a particular employee.
Under Title VII, an employer is required "to reasonably accommodate an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice" unless
the accommodation would result in an undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.8" In defining the scope of the requirement, the Supreme
83 looked to the
Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
effect that
making an accommodation would have on both the employer and other
employees. Although Hardisonis usually cited for the proposition that an undue
hardship exists under Title VII where an employer is forced to "bear more than
a de minimis cost" in order to accommodate the plaintiff s religious beliefs, 4 the
Court's reasoning also relies heavily on the impact that providing an
accommodation would have on other employees. In order to accommodate the
employee in Hardison,the employer would have had to deny the shift and job
preference of some employees, as well as deprive them of their seniority rights
under a collective bargaining agreement.85 The Court was unwilling to conclude
that Title VII's reasonable accommodation requirement required such an unequal
outcome.86 Other courts have since extended this concern over the effects an

78. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
79. Id. at 234.

80. Id. at 239 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 723 (1978)).
81. See id. at 239-40.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
83. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
84. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).

85. See id. at 80.
86. Id. at 81.
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accommodation may have on third parties to situations outside of the collective
bargaining context. 7
IV. INNOCENT THIRD PARTY PROBLEMS UNDER THE ADA

A. Accommodations That Would Result in Other Employees Having to
Work Longer and Harder
As discussed previously, the accommodations ofjob restructuring, modified
work schedules, and extended leave have the potential to put at odds the interests
of disabled employees and non-disabled employees.88 In several cases, courts
have concluded that a proposed job restructuring or a proposed modification of
a disabled employee's work schedule that would result in other employees
having to work longer or harder is not a reasonable accommodation. 9 For
example, in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., a chemical operator suggested
that a reasonable accommodation would have been to switch him from a rotating
shift to a straight daytime shift.9 ° The difficulty with the proposal was that the
employer had no such shifts for chemical operators; instead, all operator
positions were on rotating shifts.9' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the employee was not a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of

87. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that requiring other employees to assume a disproportionate workload or to travel
involuntarily with plaintiff in order to accommodate plaintiffs religious beliefs
constitutes an undue hardship).
88. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
89. See Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996);
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Lodderhose v. Viacom
Cable, Inc., No. C9604282 SI, 1998 WL 57025, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1998); Frix v.
Fla. Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Andress v. Nat'l Pizza
Co. Int'l, 984 F. Supp. 475,489 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Rhoads v. Atchison-Holt Elec. Coop.,
No. 96-6057-CV-W-6, 1997 WL 839482, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 1997). See
generallyMorrissey v. Gen. Mills, No. 01-3696,2002 WL 1339850, at * 1(8th Cir. June
20, 2002) (stating that such an accommodation imposes an undue hardship); Basith v.
Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's proposed
accommodation because it "would result in a restructuring of both his job and the jobs
of other employees"); Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. Wis.
1996) (stating that such an accommodation imposes an undue hardship); DiPompo v.
West Point Military Acad., 770 F. Supp. 887, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting, in a
Rehabilitation Act case, plaintiff's proposed accommodation of reallocating job duties
because, in part, plaintiff was requesting to be excused from a duty "considered
sufficiently burdensome that it is used as a disciplinary measure" and to have that duty
reallocated to other employees).
90. Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094.
91. Id.
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the ADA because he could not perform the essential functions of the position
with a reasonable accommodation. The court based its decision, in part, on the
fact that moving the plaintiff to a straight day shift would place a heavier burden
on the rest of the operators in the plant.92

According to the court, "an

accommodation that would result in other employees having to work harder or
longer is not required under the ADA.""' Thus, the focus of the court's analysis

in this respect was on the effect the accommodation might have on other
employees. Importantly, there was no suggestion in this portion of Turco that the
plaintiff's proposed accommodation was unreasonable based upon its effect on
the employer or because it would have imposed an undue hardship on the
employer. Instead, the court upheld the lower court's summaryjudgment for the

employer based on its conclusion that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual
with a disability, i.e., that he was not capable of performing the job's essential
functions with a reasonableaccommodation.94

B. Reassignment to a Vacant Position in Violation of a Legitimate,
Non-DiscriminatoryPolicy
As discussed previously, reassignment to a vacant position is the
accommodation that is most likely to impact both employers and other

92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Milton, 53 F.3d at 1125).
94. Id. at 1093-94. In support of its conclusion in this respect, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited an EEOC regulation discussing when a proposed accommodation
might impose an undue hardship. Id. at 1094 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1996)).
Thus, the implication might be that the court considered the plaintiffs proposed
accommodation to impose an undue hardship. However, as mentioned, the court was
clear that it was assessing the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation as opposed
to the hardship on the employer that it might impose. See supra. In addition, the court
cited Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995), a decision from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for support of its stated position. Milton appears to be the
original source for the notion that an accommodation that would result in other
employees having to work harder or longer is not required under the ADA. Milton also
cited the above-referenced regulation regarding the undue hardship analysis. However,
it characterized the regulation as suggesting that the "impact to other employees on their
ability to do their duties is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of an
accommodation." Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124-25 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Milton
court specifically based its decision in the case on its belief that none of the plaintiff's
proposed accommodations were reasonable. Id. at 1124. As such, it is fair to say that
the Milton line of cases are premised upon the notion that consideration of the effect that
an accommodation might have on other employees is not exclusively in the domain of
the undue hardship analysis, but that the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation
may be determined in part by the effect that the accommodation would have on other
employees.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in US Airways, Inc. v.

Barnett, numerous courts had concluded that an employer was not required to
ignore a legitimate, hion-discriminatory transfer policy in order to reassign a
disabled employee.96 Despite this general rule, courts split on the question of
whether an employer could be required to depart from certain types of neutral
employment policies in order to comply with the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement. These cases almost invariably involved situations
where the departure might ultimately have an adverse impact on another
employee.
1. Light-Duty Assignments and Part-Time Employee Policies
The use of employer policies regarding light-duty assignments has
generated substantial litigation under the ADA. Employers may set aside a
certain number of light-duty assignments for several reasons, including a desire
to limit workers' compensation liability related to on-the-job injuries,97 the
feeling of "a special obligation arising out of the employment relationship" to
create positions for employees who have been injured on the job,98 and as a
means of easing an injured employee back to work.99 According to the EEOC,
it may be a reasonable accommodation for an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a light-duty position, provided that such a position is vacant. 0 0
However, as with other reassignments, an employer is not required to create such
a position or to convert a temporary light-duty position into a full-time
position.'
Not surprisingly, employers frequently establish policies to help define
employees' eligibility for light-duty positions and to define the nature of the
positions themselves. In situations where the reassignment of a disabled

95. See supranotes 44-45 and accompanying text.
96. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998).
Some courts had not been as precise as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
explaining exactly which types of rules employers are not required to ignore. However,
the thrust of the decisions of several other circuit courts of appeals is in keeping with the
Seventh Circuit's view. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353-54 (4th Cir.
2001); Bums v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257-58 (6th Cir. 2000); Duckett
v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997).
97. Sharpe v. Henderson, No. CV-00-71-ST, 2001 WL 34039485, at *10 (D. Or.
Oct. 19, 2001).
98. Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 1998).
99. Middleton v. Ball-Foster Glass Container Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 782, 798 (N.D.
Tex. 2001), af'd,No. 01-10329, 2002 WL 243242 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2002).
100. EEOC, TechnicalAssistanceManual on the Employment Provisions(Title I)
of the ADA, 8 FEP MAN. § 9.4, at IX-5 (1992).
101. Id.; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2003).
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employee to a light-duty position would violate such a policy, there is the
potential that a departure would impact not only the employer, but other
employees. If, for example, an employer set aside a limited number of temporary
light-duty positions and it made an exception to its existing policy conceming
eligibility for such positions in order to accommodate a disabled employee, it
could reduce the number of available positions set aside for eligible, nondisabled employees.'° 2
In Middleton v. Ball-FosterGlass ContainerCo., a federal district court in
Texas concluded that it was not a reasonable accommodation for an employer to
reassign the plaintiff to light-duty because the reassignment would have
conflicted with the employer's light-duty policy or practice. 0 3 Under the policy,
only those employees with temporary work restrictions were eligible for lightduty assignments.'0 4 The purpose of the policy was to ease temporarily injured
employees back to full-time work.'
However, the plaintiffs physical
impairment permanently prevented him from returning to his old job.0 6 Thus,
because the plaintiff's requested assignment to a light-duty position conflicted
both with the employer's policy and the underlying reasons for that policy, the
court concluded that reassignment was not a reasonable accommodation.0 7
In Sharpev. Henderson,'"8 a federal district court in Oregon concluded that
reassignment to a limited-duty'o° position was not a reasonable accommodation
because it would have conflicted with the employer's neutral policy regarding
such assignments." 0 Under the policy, employees with compensable workers'
compensation claims were eligible for limited-duty assignments, but employees
whose workers' compensation claims were denied were not eligible for the
positions."' The court reasoned that although an employer has an obligation to
reassign a disabled employee to a position he can perform, it is only required to
do so when the position is available under the employer's existing policies." 2
Thus, because the employee was not eligible for workers' compensation benefits,
the proposed accommodation was not reasonable.' "'

102. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1998).
103. Middleton, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 798.

104. Id.
at 787.
105. Id. at 798.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 797-98.
108. No. CV-00-71-ST, 2001 WL 34039485 (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2001).
109. There was a distinction between light-duty assignments and limited-duty
assignments under the employer's policy. See id. at * 12.
110. Id. at *13.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Given the increased use of part-time employees in recent years, it is natural
that employers have developed separate policies related to such employees.
These policies may extend to light-duty assignments. In Pulcino v. Federal
Express Corp.," 4 the Washington Supreme Court dealt with such a policy in a
case involving the state's disability discrimination statute.
Although
Washington's statute is not identical to the ADA, it does contain the same duty
of reasonable accommodation and the court had previously concluded that this
duty could include reassignment to a vacant position."' The employer asserted
that it was not required to reassign a disabled employee to a light-duty position
because only full-time employees were eligible for such positions under the
employer's policy." 6 The court took a far less deferential approach to the
existence of the employer's neutral policy than many federal courts, stating that
an employer "should not be able to hide behind a policy of not providing light
duty for part-time employees when such a policy is unreasonable."' 7 The court
suggested that in "an era where some employers rely heavily on a part-time
workforce, such a policy may be subject to question," and concluded that the
reasonableness of the employer's policy was ajury question."'
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an employer's
preference for full-time employees over part-time employees in reassignment
matters in Daugherty v. City of El Paso."9 Under the city's charter, the city's
civil service system gave full-time employees priority over part-time employees
in filling vacant positions.' 2 ° There were several full-time positions available,
but the city was unwilling to depart from the policy contained in the charter for
fear of receiving complaints (and possible lawsuits) from full-time employees if
the plaintiff, a part-time employee, were reassigned to the position.' 2' The court
sided with city, stating that it did not read the ADA as requiring "affirmative
action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that
disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are
not disabled."' 22

114. 9 P.3d 787 (Wash. 2000).
115. Id. at 794-95 (citing MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 983 P.2d 1167 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999)).
116. Id. at 795.
117. Id. at 796.
118. Id.
119. 56 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 700.
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2. Best-Qualified Individual Cases
According to the EEOC, to satisfy the reasonable accommodation
requirement in a reassignment case, a disabled employee must be given the
vacant position if he or she is qualified; it is not sufficient that the employee
simply be allowed to apply for the position and compete against other applicants
or current employees.2 3 At least two federal appellate courts have agreed,
suggesting that the reasonable accommodation requirement would amount to an
empty promise if an employer could satisfy the requirement by simply allowing
the disabled employee to compete for the vacant position.' 24 As the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Smith v. MidlandBrake, Inc., the statute does
not say"considerationofareassignment to avacantposition."'' 5 Thus, the word
"'reassignment' must mean something more than the mere opportunity to apply
for a job with the rest of the world."'" 6
In response, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
referred to the EEOC's policy as "affirmative action with a vengeance." '27
Writing for the court in EEOCv. Humiston-Keeling,Inc., Judge Posner savaged
the EEOC's contention that the reassignment accommodation requires an
employer to "give [a disabled employee] the [vacant] job even if another worker
would be twice as good at it, provided only that this could be done without
undue hardship to the employer."' 28 While acknowledging that antidiscrimination laws, and the ADA in particular, may impose costs on employers,
Judge Posner argued that:
[T]here is a difference, one of principle and not merely of cost,
between requiring employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best
applicant for a job, who might be a disabled person or a member of
some other statutorily protected group, and requiring employers to hire
inferior (albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely because they are
members of such a group.' 29

123. See Enforcement Guidance,supra note 43, at n.90.

124. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1999);
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
125. MidlandBrake, 180 F.3d at 1164 (emphasis added).

126. Id.
127. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 1028.
129. Id. at 1028-29. Tweaking the facts ofHumiston-Keelingtoillustrate his point,
Judge Posner suggested that, under the EEOC's view, an employer would be required to
reassign a twenty-nine year-old white male with severe tennis elbow to a vacant position
over a sixty-two year-old black woman with no disability despite the fact that the woman
was "not only the better applicant but also a member of one of the minority groups that
the laws administered by the EEOC are supposed to be protecting." Id. at 1027. Judge
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These types of cases clearly pit the interests of employers at odds with the
interests of disabled employees; however, the conflict that arises between a
disabled employee and other employees is at least as substantial. An employer
is not required to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position if the
employee is not qualified for the position. 3 ° Thus, even if the employer is not
able to fill the vacancy with the most qualified employee, it still ends up with a
qualified individual in the position. The conflict between a disabled employee
and a better qualified employee is analogous. As reassignment is the
accommodation of last resort, if a disabled employee is denied the vacancy, the
employee will be out of a job and, because of his or her disability, may have
difficulty obtaining a new job."' If a better qualified employee is denied the
vacancy, presumably he or she will still have a job, just not the job desired.
However, the impact on the better qualified employee could be more than de
minimis. For whatever reason, the employee desired to move into the new
position, so presumably the employee considered the vacant position to be an
improvement over the employee's current position. Moreover, the vacant
position may objectively be an improvement over the current position even
though it is not technically a promotion.
3. Collective Bargaining Agreement Cases
One of the earliest sources of conflict over the reasonable accommodation
requirement involved the rights provided to other employees by a collective
bargaining agreement.' 32 The general rule that soon emerged was that an
employer is not required to violate the seniority provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement in order to accommodate a disabled employee through
reassignment to a vacant position; such an accommodation would be
unreasonable per se.'33 Importantly, despite the fact that violating the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement potentially subjects an employer to legal
action, most courts have tended to focus on the effects on other employees of
reassigning a disabled employee in violation of a collective bargaining

Posner continued, "Thus on the Commission's view there is a hierarchy of protections
for groups deemed entitled to protection against discrimination, with the disabled being
placed ahead of the members of racial minorities." Id.
130. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
131. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 42.
132. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995).
133. This is true under both the ADA and the "linguistically similar Rehabilitation
Act." US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392-93 (2002); see Vikram David
Amar & Alan Brownstein, ReasonableAccommodations Underthe ADA, 5 GREEN BAG
2D 361, 361-62 (2002) (stating that even before Barnett, "everyone had already agreed
that seniority in the context of [collective bargaining agreements] is largely beyond the
scope of the ADA").
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agreement.'34 Thus, the general rule is that an accommodation that requires an
employer to violate another employee's contractual rights is not reasonable.' 35
Despite this general rule, one federal appellate court has expressed a
willingness to inquire into the specific facts of a case to determine whether an
accommodation that would violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
might nonetheless be reasonable. In Aka v. Washington HospitalCenter,'36 the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals initially rejected the position that the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement served as a per se bar to an accommodation that
conflicted with those terms.137 The court noted that the ADA's legislative history
specifically stated that while the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
may be considered a factor in determining the reasonableness of a proposed
accommodation, the terms of the agreement "would not be determinative on the
issue."38 For example, the court suggested in dicta that a reassignment requiring
a non-disabled employee who was entitled to a vacant position under the
collective bargaining agreement to simply wait an extra day to receive an
identical assignment might be reasonable, despite the fact that it would conflict
with the literal terms of the agreement. 39 Thus, the court was unwilling to make
blanket assumptions about whether a proposed accommodation could trump the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement or vice versa, and instead adopted an
approach that looked to the degree of impact on the non-disabled employee. 4
The decision was later withdrawn and the court did not address the issue when
41
the case was reheard en banc.'

134. See Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement would violate the rights
of other employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement); Eckles v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that reassignment in such cases
"poses a conflict not so much between the rights of the disabled individual and his
employer and union, but between the rights of the disabled individual and those of his
co-workers"); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating in the context of
the Rehabilitation Act, "To give plaintiff such a new position would violate the collective
bargaining rights of other employees ....).
135. See, e.g., Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114.
136. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affiden banc on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
137. Id. at 896.
138. Id. at 895 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989)).
139. Id. at 896.
140. See id.
141. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

MISSOURI LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 68

4. Unilaterally-Imposed Seniority Systems and
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett presented the Supreme Court with its first
opportunity to speak to the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement in the
work setting. Robert Barnett was a US Airways employee who injured his back
while working in a cargo-handling position.'4 2 Although no collective
bargaining agreement covered Barnett's situation, US Airways had a seniority
system that, according to the trial court, had been in place for decades and
governed "over 14,000 US Air Agents." '43 Barnett invoked his seniority rights
and transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom.'"
Under the seniority system, which was unilaterally imposed by US Airways, the
mailroom position periodically became open to seniority-based employee
bidding. 45 Two years after injuring his back, Barnett learned that at least two
more-senior employees intended to bid for the mailroom job. 46 In response,
Barnett requested that US Airways make an exception to its seniority rule and
permit him to remain in the mailroom.'47 After considering the matter, 4US
Airways declined to make an exception to its rule and Barnett lost his job.
The issue on certiorari was whether the ADA "requires an employer to
reassign a disabled employee to a position as a reasonable accommodation even
though another employee is entitled to hold the position under the employer's
bona fide and established seniority system."' 49 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals had previously concluded that an employer was not required to take
such action, 50 while the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Barnett,had held that
the existence of a seniority policy was only one factor in the reasonableness
determination.'' Barnett argued that US Airways should be forced to defend the
case on undue hardship grounds, not on the basis that the proposed
accommodation was unreasonable.' 52 Relying on the EEOC's regulations,
Barnett argued that a "reasonable accommodation" was an "effective" one, i.e.,
one that "enable[s] a qualified individual with a disability to perform the

142. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 395 (2002).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 391.
145. Id. at 394, 404.
146. Id. at 394.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 395-96.
150. EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2001).
151. Barnett v. US Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 535
U.S. 391 (2002).
152. Id.
at 1110-11.
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essential functions of [a] position."' 53 Barnett argued that, particularly in the
context of reassignment to a vacant position, such an interpretation was required.
Under the statute, the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of an
accommodation is on the plaintiff, while the burden of establishing the
imposition of an undue hardship is on the employer.'54 According to Barnett, by
defending the suit on the basis of a "seniority rule violation," US Airways was,
in effect, arguing that the reassignment amounted to the imposition of an undue
hardship.'
Accordingly, if Barnett were required to demonstrate that
reassignment was a reasonable accommodation in spite of the violation of the
seniority rule, he would be forced to prove a negative, "an absence of hardship,"
while US Airways was in the superior position to prove the existence of such a
hardship.'56 Thus, Barnett argued, he should only have to establish that his
proposed accommodation was effective.
The Court rejected Barnett's burden of proof argument, stating that "in
ordinary English the word 'reasonable' does not mean 'effective,"' nor did the
statute suggest such an interpretation.'57 Importantly, the Court suggested that
an accommodation could be unreasonable based on its impact, "not on business
operations, but on fellow employees."' 58 An accommodation that was simply
"effective" could lead to "dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee
benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the
business itself, maybe relatively indifferent."' 59 Instead of choosing to interpret

the word "reasonable" as meaning "effective," the Court interpreted the term to
mean something along the lines of "feasible for the employer" or "plausible."' 60
In a somewhat circular fashion, the Court suggested that the plaintiff's burden
in establishing the existence of a reasonable accommodation is to "show that an
'accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of
cases."'' According to the Court, "Once the plaintiffhas made this showing, the
defendant/employer then must show special (typically case-specific)
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular
circumstances."' 62

In applying this standard, the Court took a fact-specific approach to
determining what the relevant "run of cases" would be. For the Court, the proper

153. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 399 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o)(ii) (2001)).
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 400-01.
160. Id. at 401-02; see also id. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 402.
162. Id.
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question was whether reassignment to a vacant position (an accommodation
which would be reasonable "in the run of cases") is not a reasonable
accommodation when it would violate a seniority policy. 63 According to the
Court, the violation of such a policy would "ordinarily" make reassignment an
unreasonable accommodation.'" In reaching its conclusion, the majority focused
on the benefits that flow to employers and other employees from seniority
systems, but with an emphasis on the benefits to other employees. Such systems
"creat[e] and fulfill[] employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment"; they
provide "job security and an opportunity for steady and predictable advancement
based on objective standards"; they help establish an order as to who will be laid
off during a reduction in force; they "include an element of due process, limiting
unfairness in personnel decisions"; and they "encourage employees to invest in
the employing company, accepting less than their value to the firm early in their
careers in return for greater benefits in later years." '65 Most important, in the
Court's determination, was that requiring an employer to show more than the
existence of a seniority system "might well undermine the employees'
expectations of consistent, uniform treatment--expectations upon which the
seniority system's benefits depend.""' Although the Court focused primarily on
the benefits to employees that flow from seniority systems, the Court also
recognized that such systems play an important role in management-employee
relations more generally. Seniority systems enable management to apply "more
uniform, impersonal" seniority rules instead of "complex case-specific
'accommodation' decision[s],"' 67 thereby eliminating some of the burden
imposed by the ADA on employers. Once such systems are established,
violations of or variances from them may produce difficulties for employeemanagement relations.'" "Discretionary" accommodation decisions made by
employers "would involve a matter of the greatest importance to employees,
namely, layoffs."' 69 By limiting their discretion in such matters through the
implementation of seniority systems, employers have created "expectations of
consistent, uniform treatment" that must be maintained if the benefits of seniority
systems are to be realized. 7 ' If a reasonable accommodation could trump
seniority systems in "the run of cases," the benefits of such systems would
be lost.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 404 (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403-05.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
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In support of its assessment of the importance of seniority systems, the
majority also pointed to the Court's past recognition of "the importance of
seniority to employee-management relations" in the context of a requested
accommodation for religious practices in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison.7 ' The majority characterized the Court's prior holding as establishing
that "an employer need not adapt to an employee's special worship schedule as
a 'reasonable accommodation' where doing so would conflict with the seniority
'
rights of other employees."172
In conclusion, the Barnett majority stated that it
could "find nothing in the statute that suggests Congress intended to undermine
73
seniority systems in this way."'
The majority did provide at least two victories for disabled employees.
First, the majority stated that a disabled employee "nonetheless remains free to
show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of
a seniority system. . , the requested 'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the
particular facts."'" Such "special circumstances" might include where the
employer, "having retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally,
exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing employee expectations.., to the
point where one more departure, needed to accommodate an individual with a
disability, will not likely make a difference."'7 Or perhaps the plaintiff could
show "that the system already contains exceptions such that, in the
circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to matter."'' 7 Ultimately,
however, the plaintiff must show why a seniority system, which carries a
presumption of reasonableness, should not be a bar to concluding that the
plaintiff's request for reassignment in violation of the policy is unreasonable.'77
Second, the Court rejected US Airways' argument that the ADA does not
require employers to provide "preferential" treatment for disabled employees by
requiring employers to depart from neutral rules. 171 Indeed, the Court explicitly
recognized that the reasonable accommodation requirement requires employers
to treat disabled employees differently, "i.e., preferentially."' Although the
Court's ultimate holding is that it is generally unreasonable to require an
employer to depart from a seniority policy, "the fact that the difference in
treatment violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the

171. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)).
172. Id. at 403.
173. Id. at 405.

174. Id.

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 405-06.

178. Id. at 397.
179. Id.
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accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach." 8 ° Thus, the Court seems to
reject the rule advanced by several lower courts that an employer is not required
to ignore legitimate, non-discriminatory intra-company transfer policies.
The majority opinion prompted two separate concurrences and two separate
dissents. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and Justice Souter's dissent in
particular seem to view Barnett's accommodation rights as sufficient to trump
the other employees' expectations of consistent, uniform treatment. Although
she signed on to the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor made clear that she did
not fully agree with the majority's approach andjoined the majority, in part, only
to prevent a stalemate.' 8' Justice O'Connor viewed the conflict in Barnett as
primarily being between Barnett and the more-senior employees. For Justice
O'Connor, the key question in such cases is whether the position in question is
truly "vacant." Under Justice O'Connor's rationale, "a vacant position is a
position in which no employee currently works and to which no individual has
a legal entitlement."'3 2 Where a legally enforceable seniority rule exists, the
person with the contractual right to the position becomes the "possessor" and the
position cannot be considered "vacant." ' 83 Where the seniority system in
question is unenforceable, the employee expecting assignment to a position
"would not have any type of contractual right to the position," and the position,
34
therefore, would be "vacant."' 9
Justice O'Connor concluded by suggesting that the loophole created by the
majority, which allows a disabled employee to show that "special circumstances"
exist that make reassignment reasonable, "will often lead to the same outcome"
as the test Justice O'Connor proposed.' If the seniority policy is unenforceable,
and if employers have retained the right to change the system, thus possibly
permitting frequent exceptions to the policy, then employees will have reduced
"expectations that the system will be followed."' 86 Therefore, a disabled
employee "may be able to show circumstances that make the accommodation
'reasonable in the particular case."" 87
Justice Souter's chief complaint with the majority approach was that it gave
such weight to the importance of seniority rules that it almost insulated them
from the reasonable accommodation requirement. In his dissent, Justice Souter
focused on the effects that Barnett's request for reassignment would have on the
competing interests of all three concemed parties. Although acknowledging the

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
See id. at 408 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 411 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
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"value and importance of seniority systems," Justice Souter found it hard to
believe that US Airways' system was "any match for Barnett's ADA
requests."' 88 Looking at the interests of US Airways, Justice Souter suggested
that if Barnett's request would have resulted in something "more than minimal
disruption to US Airways's operations," such as creating "unmanageable ripple
effects," the request might not have been reasonable. 89 However, no such
evidence existed. 90 As far as Barnett's interests were concerned, the ADA
obviously gave him a right to a reasonable accommodation. According to
Justice Souter, Barnett's interests were made stronger by the fact that he had
already held the job in question for two years. 9' Thus, according to Justice
Souter, "perhaps unlike ADA claimants who request accommodation through
reassignment, Barnett was seeking not a change but a continuation of the
status quo."' 92

Turning to the interests of the other non-disabled employees and those
similarly situated, Justice Souter suggested that the effect of granting Barnett his
proposed accommodation would have been minimal and that the interests of the
other employees paled in comparison to Barnett's. As far as the effects on other
employees, Justice Souter noted that "no one would have lost ajob on [Barnett's
account]" and there had been no showing that Barnett "would have overstepped
an inordinate number of seniority levels by remaining where he was."' 93 Other
employees had no contractual right to any position under US Airways'
unilaterally-imposed seniority system. US Airways' reservation of its right to
"change any and all" of the policies contained within its handbook effectively
prevented employees from asserting a contractual right to the position in
question. 9 " Thus, US Airways "took pains to ensure that its seniority rules
raised no great expectations."'9 s
In addition to the interests of the affected parties, Justice Souter also looked
at the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement in relation to other federal
anti-discrimination law. To Justice Souter, nothing in the statutory language or
legislative history suggested that an employer's seniority system could somehow

188. Id. at 420, 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 423-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting US Airways' Agent Personnel Policy
Guide). Justice Souter continued, "[I]t is safe to say that the contract law of a number of
jurisdictions would treat this disclaimer as fatal to any claim an employee might make to
enforce the seniority policy over an employer's contrary decision." Id. at 423-24 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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be insulated from the reasonable accommodation requirement. 9 6 In contrast,
Justice Souter pointed out that both Title VII and the ADEA contain "explicit
protection for seniority" in the form of provisions allowing employers to provide
different benefits pursuant to a bona fide seniority system and to abide by the
terms of a bona fide seniority system.'97 "Because Congress modeled several of
the ADA's provisions on Title VII," Justice Souter suggested, "its failure to
replicate Title VII's exemption for seniority systems" provided "more than a hint
that seniority rules do not inevitably carry the day."' 98 After weighing the
competing interests, Justice Souter concluded that Barnett's requested
accommodation was reasonable and that US Airways should be forced to
demonstrate that it would work an undue hardship before refusing to grant the
request.
Justice Scalia dissented on different grounds. The problem with the
majority's approach, according to Justice Scalia, is that it renders the ADA's
reasonable accommodation provision "a standardless grab bag-leaving it to the
courts to decide which workplace preferences . .

.

can be deemed

'reasonable."" 99 The approach advocated by Justice Scalia would eliminate any
need to resort to a weighing of competing interests in the context of a situation
like in Barnett because, in effect, the statutory language has already
accomplished this process. Justice Scalia's reasoning is roughly as follows: the
ADA makes it illegal to discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability becauseofthe disabilityof the individual.0 ° Discrimination under the
statute includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."2 '0
"Read together," Justice Scalia argued, "these provisions order employers to
modify or remove (within reason) policies and practices that burden a disabled
person 'because of [his] disability.'" 2 2 Because US Airways' seniority rule did
not bear more heavily on Barnett than other employees because of his disability,
US Airways was under no obligation to deviate from the rule.20 3

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 421-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 412-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). There is at least some support in the legislative

history for Justice Scalia's approach. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 65 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348 ("The accommodation process focuses on the
needs of a particular individual in relation to problems in performance of a particularjob
because of a physical or mental impairment.") (emphasis added).

2003]

REASONABLE A CCOMMODA TIONS

C. Is the ReasonableAccommodation Requirement a
"StandardlessGrab Bag"?
While Barnettpresented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to provide
some clarity not just on reassignment issues but on the reasonable
accommodation requirement as a whole, ultimately the decision may have simply
muddied already muddy waters. The clearest standard that could have emerged
from the case was Justice Scalia's, which would require employers to remove
only disability-related obstacles. Unfortunately, this approach would also greatly
reduce the reach of the reassignment accommodation-the last resort available
to fulfill Congress's goal of integrating individuals with disabilities into the
workplace.
In terms of providing predictability for future litigants, the rule adopted by
many courts that an employer is not required to ignore a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy on intra-company transfers would have provided perhaps
the next best alternative. However, stated as broadly as it was, the rule was
arguably over-inclusive in light of the fact that the ADA was designed to alter
the ability of employers to rely on blanket approaches to workplace matters and
also because the ADA specifically lists the modification of policies as a possible
reasonable accommodation.2"4 As other courts have noted, the fact-intensive
nature of the ADA makes the creation of bright-line rules problematic." 5
Similarly, the Court could have announced a broader rule that went beyond
seniority policies and held that the same presumption of reasonableness that
applies to seniority systems applies to all neutral intra-company transfer policies.
In an effort to preserve some measure of harmony with existing federal antidiscrimination law, the Court could have concluded that, given the wide latitude
that Congress and the courts have historically granted employers in establishing
such policies, it would be unreasonable in the run of cases to require an employer
to depart from a policy that is so fundamental to the exercise of employer
discretion.2"6 Although the Court stopped short of announcing such a rule, the
Court's reasoning regarding the expectations created by seniority policies could
easily transfer to other types of neutral policies.20 7 However, by focusing as
heavily as it did on the special status that seniority systems occupy in
employment law and labor-management relations, it is doubtful that the Court

204. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397-98.

205. See Reed v.LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,259 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001); see
also Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that
"[r]easonableness is not a constant").
206. Cf Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting the range of intra-company transfer policies that have been upheld by courts in

other contexts).
207. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 35-36.
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intended this reading of the decision. Moreover, the same problem of overinclusiveness that arguably plagued the bright-line rule regarding validating
neutral employer policies would apply to a rule establishing the presumptive
validity of such policies.2'"
Alternatively, the Court could have taken a more policy-specific approach.
It could have concluded that seniority policies fall within a certain undefined
class of important employer policies that are so fundamental to the way an
employer does business that it would be unreasonable to require an employer to
set them aside. Indeed, this seems to be the approach the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. where the court stated that
"[a]n employer need not violate.., important fundamental policies underlying
legitimate business interests."20 9 According to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, there are policies that are so "important" and "fundamental to the way
an employer does business that it would be unreasonable" for an employer to set
21
them aside "in order to accomplish reassignment of a disabled employee."
Thus, determining whether a proposed deviation from a policy was a reasonable
accommodation in a given case would depend on whether the policy fell within
an unspecified category of "important" policies that are "fundamental" to the
way an employer does business.
If "importance" were to become the standard, however, courts would have
to engage in a difficult process of categorization and line drawing that could
potentially be over or under-inclusive in terms of protecting an employer's
interests. Such an approach could, and arguably already did, lead to conflicting
standards."' It might be a fairly easy matter to conclude that, because decisions
as to which employee is most likely to be of benefit to an employer go to the
heart of employer discretion, allowing an employer to fill positions with the most
qualified individuals available is sufficiently important and fundamental to any
employer's business that it would be unreasonable to require an employer to
depart from it.2" 2 But would the same logic truly apply to a seniority policy? By
enforcing such policies, employers are not attempting to choose the best-

208. See id. at 18.
209. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 1176.
211. Compareid. (citing favorably cases holding that an employer is not required
to reassign a disabled employee where the transfer would violate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of the employer) with id. at 1169 ("[R]equiring the reassigned
employee to be the best qualified employee for the vacant job[] is judicial gloss
unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative history."). See EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Midland
Brake decision was not distinguishable, but regardless, an employer is not required to
ignore a policy of giving a vacancy to the best qualified individual).
212. See O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 9, at 365 (referring to an employer's
"fundamental right to select the most qualified individual for a vacant position").
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qualified individual from a pool of qualified individuals in order to maximize
profit. They are simply using the easiest means available to fill vacancies in an
effort to avoid having to choose between qualified individuals." 3 As one moves
further along the spectrum of employer decision-making, making classifications
based on an abstract notion of which policies are "important" and "fundamental"
becomes more difficult. Is a policy against reassigning an employee to a new
position when the reassignment would result in a demotion important enough to
generally make it immune from the reasonable accommodation requirement?"'
A policy of making reassignments available only to full-time, as opposed to parttime, employees?"' A policy that extends a preference in reassignments to fulltime employees over part-time employees?" 6 A policy of only reassigning
employees who have been injured on the job to light-duty assignments?" 7 A
policy of only reassigning employees who are temporarily unable to perform
their current positions?' A policy of requiring that all employees desiring a
transfer must follow certain application procedures?. 9 If each of these policies
is sufficiently important and fundamental to the way employers do business to
generally excuse an employer's refusal to depart from it, then why are neutral
leave of absence rules or fixed work schedule policies-policies that courts
generally agree an employer may be required to depart from in order to
accommodate a disabled individual-any less important? 220 At some point, an
approach that required such blanket characterizations as to whether certain
policies are sufficiently important or fundamental to the way an employer does
business would be likely to produce results even more varied than currently exist.

213. See generally EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that a seniority policy "is a neutral and non-arbitrary method of resolving
sensitive questions in the workplace").
214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

51-52 and accompanying text.
114-18 and accompanying text.
119-22 and accompanying text.
103-07 and accompanying text.

218. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
219. Compare Shapiro v. Township of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 357-58 (3d Cir.
2002) (departing from a policy that requires all employees to respond to a posting of

vacant positions may be a reasonable accommodation) with Bums v. Coca-Cola Enters.,
Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding it would not be a reasonable
accommodation to require an employer to ignore such a policy).
220. Cf. Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir.
2000) (rejecting employer's argument that it should not have to modify an employee's
work schedule because "it would eliminate employers' control over the workplace and
ability to maintain any standards" on the grounds that the ADA imposes on an employer
a duty "to modify some work rules, facilities, terms, or conditions to enable a disabled
person to work, and if [the employer's] position were given credence, it would defeat
almost any reasonable accommodation").

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Thus, the Supreme Court's instinct in Barnettto focus on the impact of the
proposed accommodation on other employees was sound. However, its
implementation of that instinct is somewhat problematic. If the focus of the
opinion is read to be on other employees' "expectations of consistent, uniform
treatment," then the Court provided little guidance to lower courts in cases not
involving seniority rules. All rules are designed to establish expectations of
consistent, uniform treatment and let employees understand the rules of the
game.22 ' Thus, the Court's reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to
virtually every neutral policy in the workplace, including transfer policies, leave
of absence policies, and fixed work schedule policies. 2 If the expectation of
consistent, uniform treatment on the part of other employees is the standard,
rather than the actual tangible effects on other employees of providing the
accommodation, then it is difficult to see any logical stopping point to the
Court's holding.
This perhaps explains the Court's repeated emphasis on the important place
that seniority policies occupy, not just in labor-management relations, but in antidiscrimination law more generally. By focusing so heavily on the importance of
seniority policies, the Court effectively limited the precedential value of its
decision. In doing so, however, it did employers and employees few favors in
terms of providing predictability. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
had previously held that an employer is not required to depart from a "bestqualified" policy, has since stated that Barnett actually supports its previouslyannounced rule. 2 3 In contrast, when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided,
prior to Barnett, that the reasonable accommodation requirement could require
an employer to reassign a less-qualified disabled employee to a vacant position,
the court specifically stated that an employer would not be required to ignore a
well-entrenched seniority policy in order to comply with the reasonable
accommodation, largely predicting the outcome in Barnett.224 Thus, Barnett's
focus on the expectations of other employees prevents courts from applying their
previously announced rule that an employer is not required to ignore a legitimate,
non-discriminatory intra-company transfer policy,225 but offers limited guidance
for lower courts to follow now that the Court has deprived them of their brightline rule. While Justice Scalia's description of the reasonable accommodation
requirement as a "standardless grab bag" may be somewhat harsh, after Barnett
it may not be entirely off the mark.
Of potentially greater utility is the Court's observation in Barnett that an
accommodation could be unreasonable based on its actual tangible impact on

221. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2001).
222. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 39.
223. Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002).

224. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999).
225. Anderson, supra note 11, at 34.
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other employees. The Court's observation concerning some of the more dramatic
effects for other employees that providing an accommodation might cause
(dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee benefits) places the
accommodation analysis on more solid ground. By focusing on the tangible
effects that an accommodation would have on other employees, rather than the
effects of the accommodation on the "expectations of consistent, uniform
treatment" of other employees, future courts could restore some semblance of
order to the ADA's "standardless grab bag."
V. THE NEED FOR A CLEARER LINE

Reasonable accommodation is a concept that simultaneously cries out for
and makes difficult the creation of bright-line rules. This is particularly true in
the case of accommodation by reassignment to a vacant position. Commentators
have criticized Congress for failing to define more precisely the scope of the
reasonable accommodation requirement.226 Indeed, some have speculated that
the reason why the Supreme Court and other federal courts have been so strict in
their interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability is because they have
sought to create a high threshold for qualifying as disabled in order to avoid
having to deal with the amorphous reasonable accommodation requirement.227
Given the highly fact-specific nature of ADA cases, it would be virtually
impossible to devise a bright-line rule to cover the types of conflicts addressed
in this Article that would not be either over or under-inclusive. Instead, the best
one can hope to accomplish is to reduce some of the existing uncertainty.
Cases in which the interests of disabled and non-disabled employees come
into conflict, however, present a situation in which something approximating a
bright-line rule is both possible and highly desirable. Congress clearly
contemplated that employers and other potential defendants would bear the costs
of allowing individuals with disabilities to participate in the mainstream of
society,22 and it would be impossible to expect that other employees would not
be burdened somewhat by the actions of their employers. The extent to which
Congress intended for other employees to bear this burden is, however, subject
to debate. The few references to the impact of an accommodation on other
employees that appear in the legislative history are inconclusive.229 As

226. Issacharoff & Nelson, supranote 7, at 339-40.
227. Id. at 320-01.
228. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA 's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in
the Civil Rights Paradigm,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 350-51 (2001).
229. See generallyO'Neil & Reiss, supra note 9, at 359 ("[Tjhere is nothing in the
legislative history that suggests that Congress intended non-disabled employees to
shoulder the burdens of the ADA at the expense of their own careers."). The only
reference to reassignment as an accommodation that has been cited by courts is

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

mentioned, however, the text of the ADA itself contains several provisions that
work to minimize the burdens on other employees that an accommodation might
cause.23° As a matter of common sense, it is difficult to believe that Congress,
in the absence of any clear legislative history to the contrary, intended to remedy
the problems facing individuals with disabilities by requiring that employers take
action that would cause other employees to suffer a materially adverse impact.
Thus far, much of the scholarship addressing the reasonable accommodation
requirement in the context of employment reflects the implicit assumption that
the non-contractual interests of employees who may be adversely affected by an
accommodation are of secondary importance to the interests of a disabled
employee."' Given the long history of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and Congress's expressed goal of bringing individuals with
disabilities into the mainstream of society, such a view is certainly
understandable. Ultimately, however, there are equities involved on both sides

susceptible to different interpretations. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,345 ("The Committee also wishes to make clear the
reassignment need only be to a vacant position-'bumping' another employee out of a
position to create a vacancy is not required."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989) (same).
Compare Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999) (using
legislative history regarding the bumping of other employees to support the conclusion
that it is a reasonable accommodation to reassign a less-qualified employee to a vacant
position over a better-qualified employee) with id. at 1181-82 (Kelly, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part) (using the same legislative history to support the opposite
conclusion). As mentioned, the legislative history concerning seniority policies
contained within collective bargaining agreements provides that the existence of such a
policy "may be considered as a factor in determining whether" an accommodation is
reasonable, although the agreement would not be determinative. H.R. REP. No. 101485(11), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. Several of the
statements made during congressional debate are of a more general nature, but reference
a concern that the ADA could be interpreted as requiring employers to give preferences
to individuals with disabilities. See 136 CONG. REc. H2,438 (daily ed. May 17, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[N]or does it require employers to give preference to
persons with disabilities."); id. at H2,439 (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("Under the ADA,
persons with disabilities will have the same rights and remedies as minorities and women,
no more and no less.").
230. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
231. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 33 (stating that the ADA "reflects an intent
to upset 'expectations,"' including those of other employees, "to the extent that theylimit
the employability of individuals with disabilities"); id. (stating that with regard to the
accommodation of job restructuring that other employees "may be required to bear the
entire burden of the marginal tasks" once belonging to a disabled employee's position);
Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1089 (stating that "the scale[s] generally should tip
in favor of the disabled employee" when an employer must choose between reassigning
a less-qualified disabled employee and a better-qualified, non-disabled employee to a
vacant position).
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of the conflict. The view that the non-contractual interests of other employees
are of secondary importance to the interests of an employee with a disability is
flawed for practical as well as equitable reasons. First, if, as Congress and the
EEOC have stated, the purpose of the reasonable accommodation requirement
is to allow for equal employment opportunity,2 32 the interests of disabled
employees and non-disabled employees should be of equal importance.
Second, minimizing the impact of an accommodation on other employees
is ultimately self-defeating for disability rights advocates. Several authors have
charged that courts are reluctant to give full effect to the ADA because they view
the statute as creating "special rights" for individuals with disabilities or because
they are resistant to the notion that sometimes equality of opportunity may require
unequal treatment.2 33 There can be no question that the ADA requires
"preferential" treatment in the sense that it may require different treatment of
disabled and non-disabled employees. However, it does not necessarily follow
that "preferential" treatment of individuals with disabilities should amount to
detrimental treatment of non-disabled employees. There is perhaps no better way
to ensure that courts remain reluctant to fully effectuate the ADA's broad
remedial goals than to adopt such a reading of the statute. Those who seek to
ensure equality of opportunity for individuals with disabilities need to be willing
to acknowledge that requiring employers to make certain accommodations in the
workplace may, in some instances, impose real burdens on employers and other
employees. 3 It is not enough to suggest that these burdens are minimal simply
because other employees have no contractual rights to maintain the status quo of
their work environment or to a particular job in the workplace. Indeed, it is
somewhat unsettling to read Justice Souter's suggestion in Barnett that the
impact on two more-senior employees of reassigning Robert Barnett to a vacant
position would be fairly minimal, in part because neither would have lost a job
as a result of the reassignment. As discussed in greater detail below, the courts
have been willing to recognize that numerous employment actions falling short
of the terms and
of termination are significant enough to constitute an alteration
235
conditions of employment under anti-discrimination law.
Finally, such an approach keeps with the approach of courts in employment
discrimination law more generally. As discussed previously, courts in the ADA
context have expressly taken into consideration the impact on other employees

232. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2003).
233. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 143; Diller, supra note 5, at 40.
234. See generally Hayward v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. CA 98-0953-F, 2001
Mass. Super. LEXIS 231, at *18 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 15, 2001) (refusing to find an
employers' duty to reassign disabled employees to vacant positions under Massachusetts
anti-discrimination statute because it would open "a Pandora's box of difficult issues
regarding the interpretation and application of this obligation by employers").
235. See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
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that modifying an existing policy or practice might have, and have protected the
interests of these individuals when they would be adversely affected by a
modification.236 In the Title VII context, the federal courts have taken care to
protect not only the contractual rights of other employees who may get caught in
the middle of a dispute between an employer and another employee, but also their
non-contractual interests. 237 Courts have been highly reluctant to allow one
employee's pursuit of his or her statutory rights to unduly impact another
employee's interests in moving into a new position 23 1 or continuing to work
under roughly the same conditions. 3
Admittedly, the Title VII cases are distinguishable, as is the approach Title
VII itself takes with respect to discrimination. For example, Congress
specifically rejected the de minimis standard of undue hardship established in
Title VII cases involving accommodations for religious practices articulated in
24 ° Yet, the Court's pronouncement in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.
Hardisonthat an accommodation that forces an employer to bear more than a de
minimis cost imposes an undue hardship was made in reference to the actual
monetary costs that would have flowed from TWA having to pay premium wages
to another employee in order to accommodate Hardison. 24' When the Court
concluded that TWA was not required to "deny the shift and job preference of
some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, 242 the Court seemed to be
concluding that such an accommodation was not reasonable2 43-an analysis
separate from the undue hardship analysis. Another more important distinction
between the Title VII and ADA cases is that Title VII proceeds from a premise
that employers must treat all employees in the same fashion, without regard to
certain characteristics. In contrast, the ADA requires employers to treat

236. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
238. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1987).
239. See Bruffv. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
240. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 68 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,350.

241. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
242. Id. at 81.
243. See id. ("It would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable
accommodation' Congress meant that an employer must denythe shift andjob preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does
not require an employer to go that far."); see also US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
391, 403 (2002) (characterizing Hardison as holding that "an employer need not adapt
to an employee's special worship schedule as a 'reasonable accommodation' where
doing so would conflict with the seniority rights of other employees") (emphasis added).
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individuals with disabilities differently. 2" Yet, the Title VII decisions, taken as
a whole, do reflect serious equitable concerns on the part of the courts with
respect to differential treatment that results in material harm to other
employees.245
VI. SOLUTIONS
Constructing a bright-line rule in cases that pit the interests of employers,
disabled employees, and non-disabled employees at odds is a difficult task. Any
rule should take into account not only the interests of the affected parties, but the
policy reasons underlying the reasonable accommodation requirement, the broad
goals of the ADA, and the need to create harmony with other areas of law. The
rule that best achieves these goals would hold that a proposed accommodation
is not reasonable when it would violate the contractual rights of another
employee or otherwise result in an adverse employment action (as that term is
defined through case law) for a non-disabled employee. Thus, the focus would
be on the actual effects or likely effects that providing an accommodation would
have on other employees. If an accommodation does not result in an adverse
employment action in a particular case, the undue hardship defense and the other
rules that have developed concerning the reasonable accommodation requirement
should be sufficient to resolve most questions as to whether an employer must
provide the accommodation.
A. Current Proposals
To date, at least two commentators have suggested approaches to dealing
with cases in which an accommodation request causes conflicts between the
interests of an employer, a disabled employee, and a non-disabled employee.
Professor Stephen F. Befort has argued that the reasonableness of an

244. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 10-11.
245. There is one possible exception to this general rule, but it is easily
distinguishable. Both Title VII and the ADEA authorize courts to order various forms
of equitable relief for victims of discrimination, including reinstatement to the
individual's formerposition. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
Despite the fact that, under existing case law, a victim of discrimination is presumptively
entitled to reinstatement, see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 424 U.S. 747, 780 n.41
(1976), the federal courts are particularly wary of authorizing this form of relief where
other employees would be materially impacted. See Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d
1135, 1149 (11 th Cir. 1986); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 121 (4th Cir.
1983); Elizabeth Newsom, The PriceofEradicatingDiscrimination:Should a Title VII
PlaintiffDisplacean Incumbent Employee?, 59 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 1395, 1403 (1991).
Importantly, reinstatement is only available where an employer has already been found
to have made an adverse employment decision on the basis of a protected class.
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accommodation depends on the type of request involved.246 According to Befort,
it is generally a reasonable accommodation for an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position even though that employee may not be the best
qualified individual.247 This result, Befort argues, is justified because a contrary
result would curtail the ADA's purpose of enabling individuals with disabilities
to remain in "the economic and social mainstream of American life. 248
According to Befort, this goal would be frustrated by a contrary rule because if
the non-disabled employee is better qualified, he or she remains employed and
is still "a strong candidate for a future transfer or promotion. ' ' 249 In contrast,
because reassignment to a vacant position is the accommodation of last resort, the
disabled employee would be out of a job. 2 0 However, Befort argues that where
an accommodation request would require an employer to violate other neutral
transfer and assignment policies that serve a legitimate business purpose, such as
a seniority policy or a "no demotion" policy, 251 the requested accommodation is
generally unreasonable. 2 The difference in results, Befort explains, is justified
because in the latter situations, such a rule preserves the discretion of employers
to adopt valid, neutral polices and protects the "legitimate expectations" of other
employees that the policies will be followed. 253 According to Befort, "An
employer's consistent application of such policies promotes fairness and
predictability, as well as creating genuine incentives for the workforce as
a whole. 254
One problem with this suggested approach is that it contains a certain
amount of internal inconsistency. If it is generally unreasonable to force an
employer to depart from a seniority or "no demotion" policy, in part because such
policies create "genuine incentives" for employees and because departures from
such policies upset the "legitimate expectations" of these employees, it is difficult
25
to see why the same reasoning would not apply to a "best-qualified" policy. S
In either scenario, the disabled employee would still be out of a job if the
employer refused to make an exception to its policy, so there is no real distinction
in terms of the consequences to the disabled employee. In addition, a "best-

246. Befort, supra note 14, at 469; Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1089.
247. Befort, supra note 14, at 469; Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1088-89.

248. Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1088-89 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116,
at 20 (1989)).
249. Id. at 1089; see also Befort, supra note 14, at 470 ("The non-disabled worker

remains employed in his or her current position, and the chance to move into a more
desirable position is deferred rather than lost.").
250. Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1089.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1091-93.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 39.
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qualified" policy would seem to create the same type of incentives for employees
as would a seniority policy. Moreover, although a variance from a "no
demotion" policy might upset the predictability that results from the consistent
application of polices, the same would be true of a departure from virtually any
employer policy, including leave policies or fixed-work schedule policies.25 6 Yet,
in the case of a "no demotion" policy, it is far less likely there would be any kind
of adverse impact on other employees who expected the policy to be enforced
than in the case of a departure from a "best-qualified" policy. 2 7 Indeed, aside
from general concerns over fairness that other employees might have, it is
difficult to see why other employees would have any particularly strong
objections to such a variance unless the disabled employee's demotion would
otherwise disrupt the workplace.
In addition, Befort's justification for his proposed outcome in the case of a
better-qualified, non-disabled employee presupposes (1) that another vacancy or
promotion opportunity will in fact arise during the employee's tenure, and (2)
that the employee will be the best-qualified individual for that position and that
he or she actually would desire that position. Neither contingency is certain, or
even likely, to occur. Finally, while Befort's point about undermining the ability
of employers to legitimately exercise their discretion in personnel matters is a
strong one, it seems to apply with more force to a "best-qualified" policy, where
an employer is directly deciding which employee is the best fit for a position,
than to a seniority policy, where an employer is abdicating any discretion as to
which employee is most likely to maximize profit.
Professor Cheryl L. Anderson has suggested with regard to reassignment
requests that clash with neutral employer policies that the Supreme Court's
decision in Barnett be limited to the specific situation of seniority policies.25
Regarding other neutral policies, a reassignment request should be reasonable "if
the accommodation requires that the employer modify only a self-imposed policy
regarding transfers and the employee is otherwise qualified for the position."259
Thus, employers would be forced to defend their neutral intra-company transfer
policies on undue hardship grounds, rather than on the issue of whether the
proposed accommodation is reasonable.26 ° For example, if an employer could
show that denying a vacancy to a better-qualified, non-disabled employee "would
have lasting effect [on the employer], this should be sufficient to show undue
'
hardship."261
Like Befort, Anderson justifies her proposed rule, in part, on the

256. Id.

257. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
258. Anderson, supra note 11, at 43.
259. Id. at 42.
260. Id. Befort also argues that the undue hardship defense can provide employers
with an "adequate escape valve" in such cases. Befort & Donesky, supranote 5,at 1090.
261. Anderson, supranote 11, at 42.
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grounds that the harm suffered by a highly qualified, non-disabled employee who
is denied a transfer is not as great as the harm to a disabled employee if he or she
is denied the position.262
Anderson's proposal is limited to accommodation cases involving requested
variances from neutral policies and focuses particularly on reassignments. As
such, it does not fully address the numerous other situations in which an
accommodation might adversely impact other employees. However, the primary
flaw in the proposal is that it does not adequately take into account the interests
of other employees. Anderson's proposal seems to proceed from the assumption
that only the denial of another employee's contractual rights is sufficient to
render an accommodation unreasonable.2 63 The frustration of non-contractual
expectations, therefore, is only sufficient to trump a disabled employee's interest
in an accommodation during the undue hardship analysis. Such a view is
problematic for the reasons discussed previously'" and for other reasons
26 5
discussed below.
The undue hardship defense focuses on the effect of an accommodation on
an employer.2 66 Although the defense does take into account the effect of an
accommodation on other employees, it does so only to the extent that providing
the accommodation would ultimately result in "significantdifficulty or expense"
for the employer.267 Thus, the focus of the undue hardship analysis is ultimately
on the effect of an accommodation on the employer's business. Yet, Anderson
takes a highly expansive view of what is meant by undue hardship. Under
Anderson's view, the standard can be met by showing that denying a transfer to
a better-qualified employee will have a "lasting effect" on the employer's
business. It is questionable whether this view is in keeping with the statutory
language or the EEOC's regulations. Departing from the "best-qualified" policy
would be unlikely to impose any administrative burden, nor would it affect the
ability of other employees to perform their jobs, thus the accommodation would
not be "difficult" to implement.
Regarding the cost of making the
accommodation, to borrow an example from Judge Posner, even if an employer
were required to pass over a non-disabled employee who would be "twice as
good" at the position as a disabled employee,26 the accommodation would not

262. Id.
263. See generallyid.at 33 ("If the problem is that expectations maybe upset, then
the entire accommodation mandate is vulnerable to attack. The ADA reflects an intent
to upset 'expectations' to the extent that they limit the employability of individuals with
disabilities.").
264. See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text
265. See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
268. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
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impose a significant cost because the employer would still be getting an
individual who was qualified for the position. The only "cost" would be the
inability to increase profits to the fullest extent possible, so it is difficult to see
how providing this accommodation would be significantly expensive or difficult
to implement. 6 9 The likely reality is that under Anderson's lenient interpretation
of the undue hardship requirement, the non-contractual interests of other
employees will rarely be sufficient to trump the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement.27
B. The Adverse Employment Action Alternative
In order to best balance the competing interests at stake, courts should adopt
the rule that a proposed accommodation is not reasonable when it would violate
the contractual rights of another employee or otherwise result in an adverse
employment action (as that term is defined through case law) for another
employee. Although this rule would not remove all of the uncertainty in the area,
it would represent a substantial step toward greater clarity. If an accommodation
does not result in such an adverse employment action for another employee, the
undue hardship defense and the other rules that have developed concerning the
reasonable accommodation requirement should be sufficient to resolve most
questions as to whether an employer must provide the accommodation. One
benefit of the rule is that it would not be restricted to certain types of proposed
accommodations (such as reassignment to a vacant position), but would instead
cover virtually every situation in which the interests of a disabled employee may
come into conflict with the interests of other employees. The rule would cover
those types of accommodation requests that could potentially implicate the
interests of other employees but leave unchanged the developing law surrounding
other types of accommodations.
Existing federal employment discrimination law helps to illustrate the
rationale of such an approach. Under Title VII and the ADEA, it is illegal to
discriminate against an individual with respect to the individual's "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."2"' In order to establish a prima
facie case, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered an adverse

269. Cf Befort & Donesky, supra note 5, at 1090 ("[I]n circumstances in which
the better-qualified employee's skills are vital to the successful performance of the
essential functions of the position in question, an employer may be able to demonstrate
that not filling the vacancy with this employee would amount to an undue hardship.")
(emphasis added).
270. Moreover, it would seem to have the effect of making it much easier for
employers to defend against other types of accommodation claims.

271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
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employment action.272 Obviously, ultimate employment actions, such as a failure

to hire or a discharge, qualify as adverse employment actions, but generally
federal courts have not limited the category of adverse employment actions to
such measures. Courts have found the existence of adverse employment actions
in cases involving a failure to promote; 27 a a demotion evidenced by a decrease in
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits or
significantly diminished material responsibilities; 7 involuntary transfer with
significantly different responsibilities, working conditions, pay, prestige, or
opportunities for advancement or salary increases; 27" and the refusal to transfer
to a position with significantly different responsibilities, pay, or prestige.276
Thus, the federal courts have recognized that actionable harm may exist for
employer actions that fall short of a refusal to hire or discharge. In keeping with
the principles of equal opportunity embodied within the ADA and the federal
courts' overall concern for innocent third parties, this same standard should apply
in reasonable accommodation cases in which the provision of an accommodation
has adverse consequences for other employees: where the provision of an
accommodation would result in adverse employment action for another
employee, the accommodation is unreasonable.
There are numerous advantages to this rule over the current state of affairs.
First, it is in keeping with the ADA's stated goal of providing equality of
opportunity for individuals with disabilities and the numerous statements

272. Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994).

273. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Morris
v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999)).

274. Flaherty,31 F.3d at 456 (internal quotations omitted).
275. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 51-52 (2d
Cir. 2002); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1564 (1lth Cir. 1994). But see Forkkio
v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that reassignment that
deprived employee of prestige was not an adverse employment action).
276. See Trujillo v. N.M. Dep't of Cott., No. 98-2143, 1999 WL 194151, at *4

(10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1999) (unpublished table opinion) (concluding that ajury issue existed
as to whether the refusal to transfer to a position that would have been the objective
equivalent of a promotion was an adverse employment action); Randlett v. Shalala, 118

F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that the refusal to transfer an employee could
constitute adverse employment action where, under the facts, the transfer was "doubtless
as important as a promotion"); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1229 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that failure to transfer employee constituted an "adverse employment action").
While each of these examples involves changes in salary, benefits, or duties, courts have
found the existence of adverse employment actions "in an employer's moving an
employee's office to an undesirable location, transferring an employee to an isolated
comer of the workplace, and requiring an employee to relocate her personal files while
forbidding her to use the firm's stationary and support services." Collins v. Illinois, 830

F.3d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 890 n.67
(D.D.C. 1981);Harris v. Richard Mfg. Co., 511 F.Supp. 1193, 1203 (W.D. Tenn. 1981)).

2003]

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

contained in the legislative history that the ADA is not designed to give
individuals with disabilities greater rights than their non-disabled counterparts.2
Such a rule would help limit concerns that the ADA is a "preference" statute that
confers special rights upon individuals with disabilities. 8
Second, the rule has some support in Barnett itself. Barnett clearly
recognized that an accommodation "could prove unreasonable because of its
impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees. 2 79 The Court's
non-exhaustive list of possible consequences for other employees from an
accommodation that might render the accommodation unreasonable ("dismissals,
relocations, or modifications of employee benefits") simply includes specific
types of recognized adverse employment actions.28 ° Third, the rule would
provide at least something approximating a bright-line for courts to follow, while
at the same time allowing for an individualized inquiry into the facts of each case.
The portion of the rule concerning a violation of the contractual rights of other
employees is as clear a rule as possible. While the federal circuits vary somewhat
in their descriptions of what constitutes an adverse employment action, there is
a general understanding as to the meaning of the term that would be sufficient to
guide courts and the relevant parties.
Despite the number of situations in which courts have found the existence
of adverse employment actions, to rise to the level of an adverse action, the harm
to the employee must be more than de minimis. 2"' Courts frequently describe an

adverse employment action as an action that results in a "significant change in
employment status."2 ' The workplace is filled with petty indignities, and by
requiring some type of material harm, the courts have prevented claims based
277. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000); 136 CONG. REc. H2,444 (daily ed. May 17,
1990) (statement of Rep. Matsui) ("This bill will make the playing field a little more even
for those with disabilities to compete in the workplace and in the marketplace."); 136
CONG. REc. H2,438 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[N]or does

it require employers to give preference to persons with disabilities."); id. at H2,439
(statement of Rep. Edwards) ("Under the ADA, persons with disabilities will have the
same rights and remedies as minorities and women, no more and no less."); 135 CONG.
REC. S 16,102 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("[I]ndividuals

with disabilities can and should be given the opportunity to compete on an equal footing
with their nondisabled counterparts."). See generally 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2003)
("[The ADA] does not guarantee equal results, establish quotas, or require preferences
favoring individuals with disabilities over those without disabilities.").
278. See supranote 233 and accompanying text.
279. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
280. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
281. See Flahertyv. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that an employer's actions must result in some "materially significant disadvantage" for
the plaintiff) (quoting Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir.

1989)).
282. Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998).
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upon a simple bruised ego.283 For example, while there are a number of cases
that have recognized claims based upon involuntary transfers, there are perhaps
an even greater number of decisions that have held that "purely lateral"
involuntary transfers-those that do not involve significantly different
responsibilities, working conditions, pay, prestige, or opportunities for
advancement or salary increases-do not constitute adverse employment
actions." 4 Likewise, employer actions that result in a "mere inconvenience" do
not rise to the level of adverse employment actions.2 5 In sum, as interpreted by
the federal courts, "not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an
actionable adverse action," 286 and "[m]ere idiosyncracies of personal preference
'
are not sufficient to state an injury."287
Instead, the action must be "of such
quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her
employment altered for the worse."28
The determination of whether an accommodation would result in an adverse
employment action would obviously depend on the facts of each case. However,
given the already fact-dependent nature of the reasonable accommodation
requirement, the rule would impose no greater burden on courts than already
exists. At the same time, inquiring into the specific facts of each case would
enable courts to prevent inequities on both sides. The reasonable accommodation
requirement is an essential aspect of the ADA, and an overly-restrictive
interpretation of the requirement would frustrate Congress's goals of furthering
integration and providing equal employment opportunity. Thus, a disabled

283. See, e.g., Flaherty,31 F.3d at 457.

284. See Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgrnt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875,879 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that refusing an employee's request for a purely lateral transfer does not qualify
as an adverse employment action); Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532 (holding that an involuntary
lateral transfer, without more, does not constitute an "adverse employment action" where
the transfer merely increased the employee's commute and did not alter her salary,
benefits, or elementary school teaching responsibilities, and the transfer was prompted
by decreasing student enrollment); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir.
1997) ("[A] purely lateral transfer [is not] .. .[an] adverse employment action.")
(quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996));
Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
allegedly retaliatory transfer was not adverse because it "did not entail a change in
position, title, salary, or any other aspect of [plaintiffs] employment[] [h]owever
unpalatable the prospect [of the transfer] may have been to him"); Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a nurse's transfer was not
adverse because it did not entail a loss of pay, duties, or prestige).
285. Oest v. I. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crady
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)).
286. Id. at 613 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89
F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)).
287. Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
288. Tortes v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997).
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employee should not be denied an accommodation because another employee
suffers a bruised ego or a minor inconvenience. At the same time, the same
employee should not be allowed to insist that a colleague endure employer action
that amounts to a materially significant disadvantage.
Fourth, such an approach recognizes the federal courts' concerns about
innocent third parties. As discussed previously, courts have been cautious about
requiring other employees to bear significant burdens when they become caught
in the conflict between an employer and another employee.289 If the ADA is to
be in harmony with existing federal employment discrimination law, courts
should take roughly the same approach.
Finally, the proposed rule has the advantage of covering most of the
controversial accommodation issues. For example, while the emerging rule
among some federal courts that an accommodation is not required under the
ADA if it would result in other employees having to work harder or longer might
arguably be a subspecies of the proposed rule, the "harder or longer" rule is
hardly precise. The proposed rule would refer judges and lawyers back to the
wealth of employment discrimination case law addressing adverse employment
actions. Thus, a disabled employee's request to take an extended leave of
absence would not be unreasonable, even if it resulted in another employee
having to worker harder or longer, as long as the effect on the other employee
was only temporary or of relatively short duration.29 ° Similarly, the fact that ajob
restructuring resulted in the non-disabled employee having to perform relatively
few or minor added duties would not render an accommodation unreasonable.29'
Instead, the increased burden on the non-disabled would have to be material.
Moreover, the "harder or longer" rule does not address what is perhaps the
most controversial of the ADA's possible accommodations-reassignment to a
vacant position. The proposed rule would apply to a reassignment in violation
of a "best-qualified" policy in certain cases. Under the rule, the mere fact that
another employee considered the vacant position to be more desirable would not,
in and of itself, establish that the reassignment of the disabled employee is
unreasonable. Rather, in keeping with federal employment discrimination law
precedent, only where the vacancy was objectively a more desirable position or
would be the functional equivalent of a promotion would the accommodation
become unreasonable.2 92

289. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.

290. Cf. Brown, 199 F.3d at 457 (finding no adverse employment action where
employee was temporarily assigned to a less desirable position).

291. Cf Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no
adverse employment action where the duties of a produce clerk were expanded to include
mopping the floor and cleaning the chrome in the produce department).
292. See Trujillo v. N.M. Dep't of Corr., No. 98-2143, 1999 WL 194151, at *5

(10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1999) (unpublished table opinion) (holding that the failure to transfer
plaintiff to a position that would not have involved a change in salary, benefits, or job

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

The proposed rule could be applied with relative ease to most reassignment
cases. In the case of a light-duty assignment policy, the determination of whether
a requested departure from such a policy would constitute an adverse
employment action would depend on whether the departure would prevent
another employee who is entitled to the position from obtaining it. Because
employers create such assignments in order to keep employees in the workplace,
an employee who was denied such a position would be likely to suffer an adverse
employment action in the event of a departure from such a policy.
In the case of an accommodation that would violate the contractual rights
of another employee, the materiality of the harm would be irrelevant. It is simply
not reasonable to require an employer to breach a contract or force another
employee to waive his bargained-for rights in order to accommodate another
employee.293 In sum, the proposed rule would add an element of clarity to
existing law and would do a better job of balancing the equities than the ad hoc
approach to reassignment issues that currently varies from circuit to circuit.
In the numerous other situations where the primary conflict is between the
interests of employers and the interests of disabled employees, the proposed rule
would simply not be implicated. However, once one addresses the impact of an
accommodation on other employees, many of the more difficult accommodation
issues become far more simple. For example, in the case of a proposed departure
from an employer's "no demotion" policy, a departure would be unlikely to
impact other employees in any material sense-the disabled employee's gain
would likely not be a non-disabled employee's loss. Thus, the primary conflict
is between the employer's interest in furthering the goals underlying the policy
and the disabled employee's accommodation rights.294 Such cases are best dealt
with by resorting to other provisions of the ADA, including the undue hardship
defense.
Although a discussion as to why an accommodation might be unreasonable
based on the effects on an employer is beyond the scope of this Article, a court
could resolve many disputes over a requested variance from a neutral policy

classification could still constitute an adverse employment action because the transfer
would nonetheless have been the objective equivalent of a promotion based on the
increase in prestige and supervisory responsibilities); Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist.,
145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding "no case... in which a court explicitly
relied on the subjective preferences of a plaintiff to hold that that plaintiff had suffered
an adverse employment action").
293. See generally US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,421 (2002) (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("I doubt that any interpretive clue in legislative history could trump settled
law specifically making collective-bargaining agreements enforceable.").
294. See generallyAnderson, supranote 11, at 13 ("Even when a court recognizes
that the ADA requires a more fact-based inquiry into the policy, there is still a tendency
to defer to the employer's business purposes without scrutinizing the actual impact the
accommodation would have on those purposes.").

2003]

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

based on the Supreme Court's clarification in Barnett that an accommodation
must be reasonable "in the run of cases" and the somewhat fact-specific approach
the Court took in resolving that issue in the case. One reason an employer might
have a "no demotion" policy is because the employer believes an over-qualified
employee is more likely to become bored and be less productive. 95 Thus, it
would not be reasonable "in the run of cases" for an employer to reassign the
director of marketing to an unskilled labor position in contravention of a "no
demotion" policy. In other instances, an accommodation that would result in a
demotion would not necessarily implicate the employer's concerns; thus, there
would be at least a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the
proposed accommodation.
In other situations, the undue hardship defense would be an adequate device
to protect the interests of employers. For example, it is potentially quite
disruptive to an employer's business to reassign a supervisor to an hourly
position in which the former supervisor would work alongside those he or she
once supervised. 96 Depending upon the specific facts, the resulting tension in
the workplace might lead to increased turnover or otherwise affect productivity.
Because such an accommodation might prove significantly disruptive or costly,
it could impose an undue hardship.297
VII. CONCLUSION
By its nature, the term "reasonable accommodation" is frustratingly
imprecise. The fact-specific nature of ADA claims makes the formulation of
bright-line rules particularly problematic, and the difference model employed by
the ADA, aside from being controversial, brings with it a unique set of
challenges. However, if the valid interests of disabled employees and their

295. See generally Jordan v. City of New London, No. 99-9188, 2000 WL
1210820, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2000) (noting that a manual accompanying the
Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level Exam contains this conclusion); Coleman
v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n employer may choose
not to hire an employee because he is overqualified for a position witlout violating
ADEA."); Woodyv. St. Clair CountyComm'n, 885 F.2d 1557, 1562-63 (1 th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that employer's belief that an over-qualified professional applicant for a
secretarial position would be more likely to become bored and quit was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision).
296. See Can I Turn Down an Applicant Because She Is "Overqualified"?, 13-7
MAss. EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 2002, available at LEXIS, Legal News Library, M. Lee

Smith Publications File.
297. See generally 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1211 I(10)(B) (2000) (listing among other factors in the undue hardship determination
"the impact.., of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility").
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employers and coworkers are to be adequately protected, courts must
unfortunately engage in some line-drawing.
As this Article has suggested, line-drawing on the basis of the existence or
importance of a neutral employer policy is problematic. However, by looking to
the impact that providing an accommodation would have on other employees,
courts can draw lines that would produce more efficient and equitable resolutions
of many accommodation claims.

